Dal D. (Yürütücü)
Yükseköğretim Kurumları Destekli Proje, 2017 - 2018
Following the invention of
self-propelled torpedoes by the British engineer Robert Whitehead in 1866, the
efficiency of large armoured fleets against fast-moving steamers reinforced
with torpedoes came under question, particularly after the Russo-Turkish War of
1877-1878. As the neutralization of the Black Sea had been confirmed by the
Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Black Sea was demilitarized under international
law until 30 October 1870, when the Russian Government unilaterally denounced
the neutralization clauses of the Treaty on the pretext of the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870. This resulted in the annulment of the articles numbered XI, XIII
and XIV by the arrival of the London Convention on 13 March 1871. According to
this, Russia would be permitted to build navies and fortify ports in the Black
Sea. Using the advantage given by the Convention, Russia composed her Black Sea
fleet of fast merchant steamers reinforced with self-propelled torpedoes, which
performed a successful campaign against the far superior Ottoman Navy during
the Great Eastern Crisis. Despite being doubtlessly inferior to her Turkish
opponent, the Russian fleet managed to paralyze the Ottoman warships, which
were compelled to go on the defensive by the fear of torpedo attacks.
Accordingly, the main focus of this paper is to examine the reasons of the
inefficiency of Ottoman ironclads against the power of torpedo by scrutinizing
the archival documents. The consequences of the experimented effectiveness of
torpedo will also be analysed to understand the changing naval strategies of
world naval powers after the Russo-Turkish War.
Key
Words: The
Ottoman Empire, Russia, Torpedo, Ironclad, the Black Sea.