Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Defence and Peace Economics, cilt.33, sa.2, ss.162-176, 2022 (SSCI)
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Net profits of state-run chance games are either earmarked for non-defence ‘good causes’ or added to the public purse in international practice. The Turkish case is unique as 95% of profits were earmarked for the extrabudgetary Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) by legislation during 1986–2007. The DISF administers security equipment procurement and domestic arms production in Turkey. The earmarking practice was dissolved in 2007 and chance game profits are transferred to the general budget. The incomings of the DISF are from the budget and from earmarked taxes from 2007 onwards. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of these practices on chance game sales for the period 1986–2017. Noting that a chance game is a joint public-private good, participation is motivated by expectations for private gain but at the same time loss is legitimised by expectations for provision of public services with the takeout part. In order to gain insight into the societal motives in chance game participation in Turkey our model is defined in the context of private (consumerism) cum public (security, warfare) interest. The VECM estimates support a long-run relationship between chance game sales and security variables.