ECA and European Recovery in Türkiye (1945–1950): The Limits of Alternative Development Finance
Sunum, ss.19, 2026
- Yayın Türü: Diğer Yayınlar / Sunum
- Basım Tarihi: 2026
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.19
- İstanbul Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
This paper reconsiders early Cold War “development” in Türkiye (1945–1950) through Actor–Network Theory (ANT). It traces postwar geopolitical dynamics that reshaped Europe’s recovery priorities, policy instruments, and development frameworks, as refracted through Türkiye’s pursuit of aid and development finance. The discussion centers on the European Cooperation Administration (ECA), Marshall Plan recovery planning, and the expert routines that rendered a European market-making project credible in policy and public discourse.
A key concern is the positioning of Türkiye within the European economy as an agricultural producer and supplier, alongside an emphasis on infrastructure as a precondition for productivity and security. Within U.S.-centered advisory networks, development strategies favored private-sector-led growth, training, and advisory support, while state-owned industrial ventures and comprehensive turnkey projects were framed as inefficient or unsustainable.
Against this background, the 1948 Mercury–Medioli initiative appeared as a rival alignment but ultimately failed to consolidate into an actionable program. A ten-year infrastructure proposal of approximately $600 million was advanced through a bond mechanism intended to mobilize U.S. capital markets while contracting Italian construction capacity. The initiative promised rapid, visible transformation while bypassing ECA and IBRD scrutiny. Doubts emerged within Turkish and U.S. networks concerning speculative financing, creditworthiness risks, and administrative capacity. U.S. diplomatic vetting further destabilized the proposal when Mercury Overseas Corporation was identified as a recently established, Panama-registered shell entity and when claimed backing from major U.S. financial actors could not be confirmed.
The article’s contribution lies in an analysis of development as a transnational technopolitical assemblage in which financing devices, expert authority, and infrastructural imaginaries were co-produced. The Mercury–Medioli episode is approached as an instructive failure of translation, clarifying how credibility tests and obligatory passage points within U.S.-centered aid channels narrowed the space for alternative programs.