When Satellites Decide: Autonomous Cyber-Physical Space Systems and the Recalibration of State Responsibility
International Astronatical Congress, Antalya, Türkiye, 5 - 10 Ekim 2026, ss.1-44, (Tam Metin Bildiri)
- Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
- Basıldığı Şehir: Antalya
- Basıldığı Ülke: Türkiye
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1-44
- İstanbul Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
Abstract
Autonomous cyber-physical space systems increasingly perform navigation, collision-avoidance manoeuvres, mission optimisation and cybersecurity functions without continuous ground-based intervention. These capabilities introduce a distinct international legal problem when an autonomous response is triggered by corrupted sensor inputs, spoofed positioning signals or maliciously altered operational data. A satellite may then execute a technically authorised decision that produces harmful effects without a contemporaneous human instruction.
This paper examines whether that redistribution of operational decision-making requires new rules of State responsibility or a more precise application of existing international law. Using a doctrinal method, it distinguishes attribution of conduct from breach of an international obligation, and both from liability for damage caused by space objects. It analyses Articles VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Outer Space Treaty alongside the general law of State responsibility, with particular attention to authorisation, continuing supervision, due diligence and cyber resilience.
Three hypothetical scenarios—an autonomous collision-avoidance manoeuvre induced by manipulated data, automated isolation of a space-system component and autonomous mission adjustment with third-State effects—are used to identify legally material facts and possible compliance failures.
The paper argues that autonomy neither creates an accountability vacuum nor automatically attributes every output of a private satellite to its supervising State under the general rules of attribution. Its central contribution is a differentiated legal assessment that distinguishes the State’s own regulatory and supervisory obligations from the status of a system’s individual acts, and separates wrongful conduct from treaty-based compensation for damage. The resulting approach preserves technological development while making the legal predicates of autonomous operations more transparent and reviewable.
Keywords: Autonomous Space Systems; Artificial Intelligence; Space Cybersecurity; State Responsibility; Outer Space Treaty; Due Diligence.
Abstract
Autonomous cyber-physical space systems increasingly perform navigation, collision-avoidance manoeuvres, mission optimisation and cybersecurity functions without continuous ground-based intervention. These capabilities introduce a distinct international legal problem when an autonomous response is triggered by corrupted sensor inputs, spoofed positioning signals or maliciously altered operational data. A satellite may then execute a technically authorised decision that produces harmful effects without a contemporaneous human instruction.
This paper examines whether that redistribution of operational decision-making requires new rules of State responsibility or a more precise application of existing international law. Using a doctrinal method, it distinguishes attribution of conduct from breach of an international obligation, and both from liability for damage caused by space objects. It analyses Articles VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Outer Space Treaty alongside the general law of State responsibility, with particular attention to authorisation, continuing supervision, due diligence and cyber resilience.
Three hypothetical scenarios—an autonomous collision-avoidance manoeuvre induced by manipulated data, automated isolation of a space-system component and autonomous mission adjustment with third-State effects—are used to identify legally material facts and possible compliance failures.
The paper argues that autonomy neither creates an accountability vacuum nor automatically attributes every output of a private satellite to its supervising State under the general rules of attribution. Its central contribution is a differentiated legal assessment that distinguishes the State’s own regulatory and supervisory obligations from the status of a system’s individual acts, and separates wrongful conduct from treaty-based compensation for damage. The resulting approach preserves technological development while making the legal predicates of autonomous operations more transparent and reviewable.
Keywords: Autonomous Space Systems; Artificial Intelligence; Space Cybersecurity; State Responsibility; Outer Space Treaty; Due Diligence.