Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Monotheisms in Medieval Islamic Thought, Leiden, Hollanda, 3 - 05 Şubat 2025, ss.1, (Tam Metin Bildiri)
The problem of divine simplicity, wherein God is posited as being identical with His essence, existence, and attributes, has been a central issue among medieval philosophers across various theistic traditions. For example, in Judaic apophatic philosophical theology, there is a pronounced recognition that God cannot possess attributes. Conversely, the Islamic tradition presents a spectrum of perspectives. Among Muslim philosophers and theologians, some oppose divine simplicity, others endorse it, while some others posit that God’s attributes are neither identical to nor different from His nature. Notably, Peripatetic philosophers, influenced by Neo-Platonism, generally appear to be defending divine simplicity. However, this paper argues that Ibn Sīnā’s defense of divine simplicity is philosophically distinct from that of other Peripatetics. Ibn Sīnā's partial departure from Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic metaphysics provides a unique framework to understand his contributions more clearly. By drawing on his Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyāt), this paper proposes that Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between general and special existence, alongside his theory of tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of existence), offers viable solutions to the challenges posed by the doctrine of divine simplicity. Additionally, it is argued that Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the ontology of modalities does not result in a modal collapse concerning the nature of God. Therefore, one can argue for divine simplicity while maintaining that God’s actions in the world are volitional rather than necessary. If correct, my argument also provides a solution for the problem of divine personal identity. In other words, in Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, one does not have to understand God as pure act to avoid the modal collapse, as in Christian theism.