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Islam Arastirmalari Dergisi, vol.2022, no.48, pp.147-182, 2022 (Scopus)
The issue of servants’ acts is one of the most controversial issues in Islamic thought and helped to sharpen the characteristics and differences between theological schools, mainly due to its relation to taklīf and servants’ responsibility. Therefore, understandings of this issue revealed differences in understandings of divine justice and wisdom, as well as in interpretations of fate and destiny. One of the noteworthy theories is that of Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) and his follow-ers, who attempted to establish responsibility and negate the determinism of servants through al-a‘yān al-thābita (fixed entities) and ‘adam maj‘ūliyat al-māhiya (un-creat-edness of quiddities). They also focused on the construction of fate and destiny in accordance with this theory and considered such construction to constitute “the secret of destiny” and “the absolute proof ” of God over the peoples. While studying the servants’ acts and the extent of their freedom of choice, we must deal with the issue of fate and destiny, as nothing in this universe is beyond fate and destiny. Human beings and their voluntary acts are no more than a part of this fate. We, therefore, first set out to understand the meaning of fate and destiny as understood by Ibn al-‘Arabī in this article. Then, we clarify the meaning of al-a‘yān al-thābi-ta. Next, we detail the issue of createdness of quiddities; as the universal entities are no more than realities and quiddities, we then tackle the issue of preparedness of quiddity and its relation to the establishment of the servant’s freedom and the negation of de-terminism. Finally, we explore criticisms of this theory and try to present an objective evaluation of opinions on the issue. According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, fate is God’s rule over things in the manner predestined. Destiny is the specification of the occurrence of a thing as it is in its fixed entity at a specific time. As such, Ibn al-‘Arabī connects the meaning of fate and destiny to the fixed entities. As for the fixed entities, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, they are the forms of divine names in eternal knowledge. If the universal fixed entities are quiddities and re-alities, were they created or not? Ibn al-‘Arabī believed that quiddities were not created. After this, we will touch upon the preparedness of quiddity and its relation to the human being’s will and freedom. The human being’s will from which his voluntary acts come would be by considering him free and able to prefer and choose between good and evil, the graceful and disgraceful. However, if everything in the universe, includ-ing the human being's acts, happens by God’s fate and destiny, where do the human being’s will and freedom come in? Ibn al-‘Arabī responds to this question by stating that tending toward good or evil comes from the requisite of various preparedness of servants’ quiddities, and the quiddities were not created. The statement of the relation between the quiddities being uncreated and the negation of determinism of servants’ acts is as follows: Fate, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, is a universal rule over things according to what is required by their fixed entities, and God’s rule over things is up to His knowledge of and about them. God's knowledge about things is according to the information they provided about their status, as knowledge is subject to the known object. In other words, divine knowledge is subject to what fixed entities give of their status by their preparedness and acceptance. Further, fixed entities are not created by a creator. Rather they are forms of knowledge of divine names, and fate is the specification of such rule by creating them in the times in which things are required to happen by their particular preparedness. So the one who determines timing is the known object, i.e., the fixed entities. Fate, knowledge, and will are subsequent to destiny, and destiny is subsequent to the known object. According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, determinism is basically negated, as the rule of fate over things is not but by them, and this is the secret of destiny. The theory of quiddity preparedness received much criticism, especially from Mustafa Sabri, Abū al-‘Alā ‘Afīfī, and others. Although it denotes the negation of determinism, as long as the fixed entities are the forms of divine names in eternal knowledge, and occur by the Holiest Emanation, then they are from Him [Exalted be He], and therefore subject to the universal law of existence. Hence, determinism is inevitable. Furthermore, the requisites of quiddity preparedness do not accept any change or variation, so sins or good deeds emerge from people according to their fixed entities in God’s knowledge and Himself. They are unchangeable because their fixed entities necessitated them to be as such and because God knows from eternity that things will be the way they are. God Almighty cannot change them because His will is not related to that which is impossible and changing them is impossible. Some followers of the Akbari school acknowledged that belief in this theory does not remove the human being from determinism, but rather removes the attribute of com-pulsion (jābiriyya) from God that would imply injustice. Finally, we found that—unlike most followers of the Akbari school—the theory of quiddity preparedness does not solve the dilemma of determinism, rather it reverses the theory of comprehensive determinism. We also discovered the vigor and rational-ity of the criticisms of this theory.