The impact of spending caps on political selection: theory and evidence from Brazil
ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, cilt.27, sa.1, 2026 (SSCI, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 27 Sayı: 1
- Basım Tarihi: 2026
- Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s10101-026-00405-y
- Dergi Adı: ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus, IBZ Online, ABI/INFORM, EconLit, Political Science Complete, Political Science Abstract (IPSA), Social Science Premium Collection (ProQuest), Business Source Ultimate (EBSCO), Pharma Collection (ProQuest), Political Science Database (ProQuest), Sociology Source Ultimate (EBSCO)
- İstanbul Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
Existing work on campaign spending caps focuses on competitive balance. This paper asks whether caps also reshape the composition of who wins. A two-candidate model is developed in which candidates differ in both quality and personal wealth, with wealth lowering the marginal cost of campaign spending. When wealthier candidates are of lower quality, they outspend their higher-quality opponents in the unconstrained equilibrium, and a binding cap constrains them disproportionately, narrowing the spending differential and raising the relative weight of quality in voters' decisions. Whether caps improve or worsen selection therefore depends on the sign of the wealth-quality correlation, which is treated as an empirical question rather than a maintained assumption. This relationship is examined using the regression-discontinuity variation generated by Brazil's 2015 campaign finance reform, which tied the 2016 municipal spending cap to the maximum expenditure observed in the same municipality in 2012 and produced a sharp drop in the permitted cap at a known threshold. Under the tighter cap regime, the probability of electing a high-quality mayor-college-educated with substantial prior elected experience-rises by about six percentage points, and winners are more educated, more experienced, and less wealthy in declared assets. The entry margin is unaffected and incumbent reelection is unchanged, indicating that the composition channel operates independently of the competitive-balance channel previously documented in this setting.