Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule

Laffond G., Laine J.

TOP, cilt.22, sa.2, ss.784-799, 2014 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 22 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2014
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1
  • Dergi Adı: TOP
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.784-799
  • İstanbul Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

We define generalized (preference) domains as subsets of the hypercube {-1,1} (D) , where each of the D coordinates relates to a yes-no issue. Given a finite set of n individuals, a profile assigns each individual to an element of . We prove that, for any domain , the outcome of issue-wise majority voting phi (m) belongs to at any profile where phi (m) is well-defined if and only if this is true when phi (m) is applied to any profile involving only 3 elements of . We call this property triple-consistency. We characterize the class of anonymous issue-wise voting rules that are triple-consistent, and give several interpretations of the result, each being related to a specific collective choice problem.